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Abstract—Today’s trend of an increasing number
of networked embedded devices pervades many areas.
Ranging from home automation, industrial or automotive
applications with a large number of different protocols,
low resources and often high demands on real-time make
it difficult to secure the communication of such systems.
A concept of an uncoupled MAC which is able to ensure
the authenticity and integrity of communication flows
between two network parties can be used. This is in
particular of advance for outdated legacy components
still participating in the network. In this paper a as-
sessment simulation model of the mechanism behind
this technology is described. It outlines the probability
of detecting an attack depending on the message au-
thentication overhead. The model considers all control
variables and performs measurements based on random
data traffic. The results of the statistical analysis state
that a high attack detection rate can be obtained even
with a small communication overhead.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the diversity of devices connected to each other
steadily grows accompanied with a continuous ris-
ing of communication flows, network monitoring and
traffic-based anomaly detection play a crucial role
in future systems. In order to perform traffic mon-
itoring and anomaly detection in networks with an
increasing amount of traffic, sampling has become an
essential mechanism meaning packets are measured
and analyzed in a selective manner. SSDE, described
in [1], encrypts only significant data of a message. [2]
presents an encryption mechanism also based on se-
lective data especially for image transmission. For
transmitting time critical data, as in the case of many
embedded systems, this can lead to a unstable sys-
tem. If encryption or decryption fails, packets are
not guaranteed to be delivered within its deterministic
time window. Since confidentiality is often a minor
priority in such networks, encryption can be neglected.
A model using an intrusion detection system (IDS)
based on selective packet sampling has been proposed
in [3]. However, IDS in the embedded environment
are associated with some drawbacks. Signature-based
systems strongly depend on the protocol being used
and anomaly based systems are mostly accompanied
with a high false positive rate. For distributed IDS,
the systems need to be small in terms of resource
consumption but then lack a variety of features. A
novel approach that counteracts the disadvantages is
performing selective message authentication. The mes-
sage authentication code (MAC) is not added to the
normal data packets but is transmitted through a secure
communication channel. This prevents failures through
the MAC generation and does not delay the traffic.
In [4] an embedded plug-in device is described which
secures the data transmission through this mechanism
without influencing the data flow using uncoupled
MACs.
However, since sampled traffic is an incomplete
approximation of the actual one, the question arises
how reliable an intruder can be detected through the
proposed algorithm. The proper adjustment of the vari-
ables involved in sampling packets is vital particularly
with regard to effective management of the bandwidth.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows:
Section II gives details on the system behaviour of the
embedded plug-in device mechanism. The proposed as-
sessment model is described in section III. Section IV
deals with the results of the performed simulations. A
short conclusion and a glance at the future work of
the ongoing research work is finalizing the paper in
section V.
II. SYSTEM BEHAVIOUR
Embedded plug-in devices inserted in the network
provide authenticity and integrity for transmitted traf-
fic. The technology has been introduced in [4] and was
further developed in [5]. A simple network scenario is
shown in figure 1 in which two end devices (A and B)
are communicating with each other. For simplification
reasons of the proposed assessment model, a sender
device A is only sending packets (mA→B) to receiver
B. The plug-in devices C and D ideally forward the
network traffic with zero latency in order to keep the
communication flows untouched. The main task of
the plug-in devices is to generate and verify message
authentication codes for the forwarded packets which
are transferred uncoupled from the original ones. In
the example C is generating a message authentication
code MAC(mA→B) over packet mA→B and is sending
it to D. Plug-in device D forwarded the original
packet, computed the message authentication code
and stored it until MAC(mA→B) from C arrives for
verification. Ideally, each packet should be measured
and verified with a message authentication code in
order to protect the communication flow. However, this
would lead to a significant increase of the network
traffic which is only possible in networks with low
bandwidth utilization. In order to detect an attack in
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networks with low capacities it is not always necessary
to observe the entire traffic. It is sufficient to measure
only for a certain amount of time. This will divide
the mechanism into multiple phases presented in [5].
The Setup Phase is used to establish a secure channel
between two communicating plug-in devices, but will
be neglected for the assessment of the actual uncoupled
MAC algorithm. The Runtime Phase is split into two
phases. During the Idle Phase which lasts a random
time duration no measurements are performed which
does not allow to detect an intruder Z for instance
injecting malicious traffic to B (mZ→B). In contrast
to the mechanism presented in [5] the plug-in devices
negotiate during the Setup Phase which device acts as
the master or slave. The master is then responsible to
start a MAC Phase after the random time expired by
informing the slave to generate and verify message au-
thentication codes. This is done by sending a regulation
packet that contains a random number of packets to be
measured from device A. If a packet from device A
is forwarded during the MAC Phase, plug-in device
C is sending a generation packet to D containing the
generated MAC(mA→B), a timestamp and a sequence
counter for, e.g., replay attack protection. Using the
proposed assessment model it is possible to determine
how the parameters defining the MAC Phase need to
be adjusted in order to detect an intruder at different
bandwidth utilizations.
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Fig. 1. Concept of the Embedded Plug-In Device
III. ASSESSMENT MODEL
For testing the probability of successfully detecting
injected intruder packets with a different quantity of
measured packets, a simulation model was developed
using the programming language Python. Because
the system behaviour of the plug-in devices is very
complex, some simplifications had to be made. This
includes that only one direction of transmitted packets
is considered meaning A and Z are sending packets to
B. Thus, also the communication of the plug-in devices
is reduced in just sending regulation and generation
packets from C to D. Feedback or heartbeat messages
as presented in [5] are not considered in the model.
First, the sequence of the intruder detection by the
plug-in device mechanism was abstracted. Figure 2
shows the modelled sequence of a measurement over
a time period. There are two phases within a mea-
surement cycle. Within the Idle Phase the next random
measuring interval time is defined by determing a ran-
dom number of packets that need to be authenticated.
Subsequently, the MAC phase begins with securing the
packets. As soon as the last sender packet has been
captured, the next Idle Phase starts. No measurement
or calculation takes place in this phase. An intruder has
two ways to intervene the network traffic. He can either
inject packets into the network or manipulate a packet
sent by the transceiver A. Since only injecting packets
affects the bandwidth, this case will be considered in
the model.
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Fig. 2. Timeline of a Measurement Cycle
In order to make a statement about the used band-
width, the associated link utilizations are calculated for
each simulated traffic. The definition of the capacity of
a link j and the used bandwidth are taken from [6].
Hence, the link usage of every simulation component
can be calculated. The definition of available band-
width is the unused part of the link capacity during
a time interval. The used link capacity of a link
Xj = Xj(t,∆) is defined by
Xj =
1
∆
Aj [t−∆, t] (1)
in which Aj is the cross traffic in bits over the link j
during a time interval ∆.
A. Input and Control Variables of the Model
The model has several input variables. These are
described in the following.
Global Parameters
• C: maximum link utilization of the transmission
medium (10 mbps, 100 mbps or 1000 mbps for
an Ethernet network)
• tmax: time window of a simulation in seconds
• ∆: computation time interval in seconds of one
bandwidth measurement
• e: packet travelling time from plug-in device C
to D
• td: delay time which a plug-in device needs in
order to process and send out a generation packet
delayed to the original sender packet
• steps: granularity of the simulation time window
Control Parameters
• nmin, nmax: Boundaries for the number of
packets n = ran(nmin, nmax) to be measured
during a MAC Phase
• alphamin, alphamax: Boundaries for the wait-
ing time alpha = ran(alphamin, alphamax)
defining the Idle Phase
• tmingap A, tmaxgap A: Boundaries for the
time gap between each consecutive packet sent
by A
• min packet size A,max packet size A:
Boundaries for the size of each consecutive
packet sent by A
• tmingap Z, tmaxgap Z: Boundaries for the
time gap between each consecutive packet sent
by Z
• min packet size Z,max packet size Z:
Boundaries for the size of each consecutive
packet sent by Z
B. Module Description of the Model
The model has been divided into six modules in or-
der to easily adapt and extend the simulation. Figure 3
shows the interaction of the individual modules.
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Fig. 3. Interaction of the Modules
1) Sender Packet Modelling: This module
is used to simulate traffic from A to B. The
packet flow is designed by a time gap between
each consecutive packet and the size of each
transmitted packet i. Both the time gap tgAi =
rand(tmingap A, tmaxgap A) and the size AAi =
rand(min packet size A,max packet size A)
are random values with fix boundaries. Packets
are generated as long as the sum of the packet
transmission time tpAi = AAiC and the time gap
for every packet is approximately the maximum
simulation time (equation 2 with index A).
2) Intruder Packet Modelling: This module
is used to simulate traffic from Z to B. The
packet flow is designed by a time gap between
each consecutive packet and the size of each
transmitted packet i. Both the time gap tgZi =
rand(tmingap Z, tmaxgap Z) and the size AZi =
rand(min packet size Z,max packet size Z)
are random values with fix boundaries. Packets
are generated as long as the sum of the packet
transmission time tpZi = AZiC and the time gap
for every packet is approximately the maximum
simulation time (equation 2 with index Z).
tmax ≈
N∑
i=0
tg{A/Z}i + tp{A/Z}i (2)
3) Computation of Measurement Information: This
module is used to calculate the start of every MAC
Phase and the number of packets which have to be
authenticated during each cycle. Therefore the time
duration for the Idle Phase represented by the value
alpha will be created randomly within the boundaries
of alphamin an alphamax. The number of packets to
be captured and processed n during the measurement
cycle is computed randomly within the boundaries
nmin and nmax. The start and duration of a MAC
Phase depends on the packets sent by the sender which
is considered in this module as well. The measure-
ment phases are iterated until tmax is reached. The
information at which point in time measurements take
place and how many packets are measured per cycle
is stored.
4) Plug-in Device Transmission: The simulation
model considers the transmission of regulation and
generation packets of the plug-in device C in order to
model the correct bandwidth usage within the system.
Fore each measurement cycle start a reg packet is
created with the size reg packet size and will be
sent to D. Every sender packet that is within a MAC
Phase causes the generation of a gen packet of size
gen packet size. The measurement phases are iter-
ated until tmax is reached. The information at which
point in time a regulation and generation packet, that
will be sent by the plug-in device, is stored.
5) Intruder Detection Ratio: The intruder detection
measurement is simulated within this module. The
results from the previously presented modules serve
as a basis. The module checks whether a sent packet
of the intruder falls into a MAC Phase and is thus
detected. It further computes the amount of intruder
packets that could be detected over the entire time
tmax of the simulation.
6) Bandwidth Computations: The bandwidth com-
putations module is used for calculating the used
bandwidth of each link j from figure 1. The com-
putation of the bandwidth is done using equation 1.
X1 represents the link utilization of the sender device
A and X2 the sum of the link load of the plug-in
device C and X1. Thus, the link utilization of C yields
X2 −X1. The intruder utilizes the link with X5. The
resulting capacity of the link to the plug-in device D
is X3 = X2 + X5.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
Two simulations for a time window of
tmax = 10 sec and a ∆ of 0.1 sec have been
performed to assess the presented model. Simulation 1
considers the detection rate for different alphamax
and changing nmax. Simulation 2 examines the link
utilizations and thus the plug-in device communication
overhead for a chosen nmax and alphamax in order
to get a detection rate of approximately 90 %.
A. Detection Rate in Relation to nmax and alphamax
The listed parameters below have been used for
simulation 1. Again they are set to obtain an average
sender bandwidth load of approximately 50 % and
an average intruder link capacity of roughly 20 %.
Multiple measurements have been performed for one
curve in figure 4 in which nmax is iterating with a fix
value for alphamax.
• nmin = 0
• nmax = 1500
• nmax iterate step = 100
• alphamin = 0
• alphamax = 0.07 sec
• alphamax iterate step = 0.02
In figure 4 the curves of simulation 1 with different
alphamax are illustrated. All curves aspire a final
value for the detection rate depending on the value set
for alphamax. The smaller the Idle Phase represented
by alphamax the higher the maximum value for the
detection rate. Parameters can be obtained from this
exponential approximation curves in order to obtain a
desired detection rate.
Fig. 4. Detection Rate over nmax for Varying alphamax
B. Bandwidth Utilizations
The listed parameters below have been used for
simulation 2. The sender and intruder parameters are
set to obtain an average sender bandwidth load of
approximately 50 % and an average intruder link
capacity of roughly 20 %. The values for alphamax
and nmax are taken from the graph of simulation 1 in
order to obtain a detection rate of approximately 90%.
The resulting bandwidth utilizations should ascertain
how much additional traffic the plug-in devices are
causing.
• nmin = 0
• nmax = 700
• alphamin = 0
• alphamax = 0.01 sec
In figure 5 the results of simulation 2 are illustrated.
The curves represent the different link utilizations Xj .
At a detection rate of 90.15 % an additional link load
of only 6.56 % on average is generated by the plug-in
device.
Fig. 5. Bandwidth utilizations with 90.15 % detection rate
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
As the simulations have shown, the model can be
used to determine the probability of the detection rate
of an attack in which an intruder injects packets to a
device. It can be determined how well an intruder can
be detected at a given network load and maximum data
overhead for the presented uncoupled MAC algorithm.
Since the transmitted regulation and generation packets
by the plug-in device are quite small in terms of
their size, the resulting overhead bandwidth utilization
mainly depends on the length of the Idle Phase defined
through the alphamax parameter. Thus, a reliable
detection of an intrusion can be achieved even for a
small communication overhead of the plug-in devices.
The proposed model is limited to a sender and a
receiver device. In a real network more devices are
participating the network. Therefore, the simulation
model needs to be extended so that the network loud
overhead caused by the uncoupled MAC algorithm
and the detection rates can be examined with multiple
sender, receiver and intruder devices. A simulation can
be also performed through a virtual network based
on [7] which relies on a Monte Carlo search tree.
The advantage of such a virtual network would be the
possible connection to a physical network environment
for further tests of the uncoupled MAC algorithm.
Furthermore, the ongoing research work includes
the substitution of the randomly generated sender and
intruder traffic by a more precise simulation. It is
planned to generate network packets on the basis of
the network simulator ns-3 [8]. The simulation should
be processed with a customizable random distribution
to simulate different network and intruder behaviours.
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